Implication of Globalisation for Competition Policy: The Need for International Co-Operation in Merger and Cartel Enforcement

53 Pages Posted: 27 Jun 2014

See all articles by Antonio Capobianco

Antonio Capobianco

OECD Competition Division

John Davies

Compass Lexecon

Sean F. Ennis

Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia; Norwich Business School, University of East Anglia

Date Written: June 20, 2014

Abstract

The complexity of co-operation in cross-border competition law enforcement increased significantly between 1990 and 2011, underlining the urgency to improve techniques and tools of competition authority co-operation. As international trade has increased, the number of competition law enforcement activities related to cross-border mergers and cartels has risen substantially (up by about 250-466% since the 1990s). At the same time, the number of competition authorities has increased by a factor of 6 since 1990, from under 20 to 120 as of 2013. The spread of competition law is a positive development but co-operation has become more complicated as a result. Between 1990 and 2011, an index of complexity of co-operation on cross-border cases has increased by between 23 and 53 times. As trade and cross-border business activity increases in the future, and young competition authorities become more active, effective co-operation will become even more complicated. Ultimately, the complexity of co-operation can lead to undesirable outcomes, such as inconsistent decisions and unchallenged illegal conduct. The costs of failures of co-operation are identified, and found to be substantial. To overcome potential failures in co-operation, new and enhanced methods of competition law co-operation should be explored.

Keywords: competition law, co-operation, complexity, globalisation

JEL Classification: K21, K33, L4, F61

Suggested Citation

Capobianco, Antonio and Davies, John and Ennis, Sean F., Implication of Globalisation for Competition Policy: The Need for International Co-Operation in Merger and Cartel Enforcement (June 20, 2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2450137 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2450137

Antonio Capobianco

OECD Competition Division ( email )

2, rue Andre Pascal
Paris Cedex 16, F-75775
France

HOME PAGE: http://www.oecd.org/competition

John Davies

Compass Lexecon ( email )

France

Sean F. Ennis (Contact Author)

Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia ( email )

United Kingdom
+44 (0)1603 591622 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.competitionpolicy.ac.uk

Norwich Business School, University of East Anglia ( email )

Norwich
NR4 7TJ
United Kingdom
+44 (0)1603 591622 (Phone)

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