Commitment Problems and Bargaining Failure: Experimental Evidence
1 Pages Posted: 1 Sep 2014
Date Written: 2014
Abstract
Bargaining models of war point to two major causes of conflict: asymmetric information, and commitment problems. This paper focuses on the commitment problem, and specifically on how responsive bargainers are to expected changes in win probabilities.
Our goal is to evaluate whether bargainers can identify commitment problems - in lab experiments, we examine subjects' choices between bargaining and fighting, given shifts in win probabilities and costs.
Keywords: bargaining, commitment, experiments
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Clark, David H. and Reed, William and Nordstrom, Timothy and Siegel, Daniel J, Commitment Problems and Bargaining Failure: Experimental Evidence (2014). APSA 2014 Annual Meeting Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2455185
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