Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2464735
 


 



Informed Consent and the Differential Diagnosis: How the Law Overestimates Patient Autonomy and Compromises Health Care


Marc Ginsberg


The John Marshall Law School

July 10, 2014

Wayne Law Review, Vol. 60, No. 2, 2015

Abstract:     
The purpose of this paper is not simply to re-examine the doctrine of informed consent. The purpose, however, is to identify how the doctrine has evolved, its scope expanded, and how it has created serious consequences for physicians and patients. Specifically, this paper focuses on the differential diagnosis - the process by which a physician arrives at a diagnosis - and how some jurisdictions have manipulated informed consent to encompass this process. This paper will urge that the application of informed consent to the differential diagnosis is an unnecessary expansion of the doctrine and, potentially, compromises health care.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 93

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Date posted: July 12, 2014 ; Last revised: September 6, 2014

Suggested Citation

Ginsberg, Marc, Informed Consent and the Differential Diagnosis: How the Law Overestimates Patient Autonomy and Compromises Health Care (July 10, 2014). Wayne Law Review, Vol. 60, No. 2, 2015. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2464735 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2464735

Contact Information

Marc Ginsberg (Contact Author)
The John Marshall Law School ( email )
315 South Plymouth Court
Chicago, IL 60604
United States
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