Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2465012
 


 



The Air Cargo Cartel: Lessons for Compliance


Howard Bergman


Howard J. Bergman Consulting

D. Daniel Sokol


University of Florida - Levin College of Law; George Washington University Law School Competition Law Center

September 29, 2014

ANTI-CARTEL ENFORCEMENT IN A CONTEMPORARY AGE - LENIENCY RELIGION (Caron Beaton-Wells, editor), Forthcoming

Abstract:     
Cartel enforcement and leniency are issues of increased academic attention. Most of the academic work in this area focuses on scholarship regarding formal modeling of leniency, empirical work, and analyses of broader legal theories, analytical trends and specific decisions. Scholarship has not focused on how leniency works in practice to detect wrongdoing and how robust and effective compliance programs may be used as a tool to take advantage of leniency. This chapter fills in the gap by offering a case study of an effective compliance program that uncovered what was at the time the largest ever international cartel. To do so, the authors undertook interviews with the legal team of Lufthansa, the leniency applicant in the air cargo conspiracy.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 14

Keywords: compliance, cartels, leniency, antitrust, competition, collusion

JEL Classification: K21, L41, M14

Accepted Paper Series





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Date posted: July 14, 2014 ; Last revised: September 30, 2014

Suggested Citation

Bergman, Howard and Sokol, D. Daniel, The Air Cargo Cartel: Lessons for Compliance (September 29, 2014). ANTI-CARTEL ENFORCEMENT IN A CONTEMPORARY AGE - LENIENCY RELIGION (Caron Beaton-Wells, editor), Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2465012

Contact Information

Howard Bergman
Howard J. Bergman Consulting ( email )
101 Quay Street
Alexandria, VA 22314
United States
D. Daniel Sokol (Contact Author)
University of Florida - Levin College of Law ( email )
Spessard L. Holland Law Center
P.O. Box 117625
Gainesville, FL 32611-7625
United States
(352) 273-0968 (Phone)
(352) 392-3005 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.ufl.edu/faculty/d-daniel-sokol
George Washington University Law School Competition Law Center ( email )
200 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20052
United States
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