Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2467783
 


 



Putting (and Keeping) Proximate Cause in Its Place


John Oberdiek


Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey - School of Law - Camden

July 17, 2014

Forthcoming in Kimberly Kessler Ferzan and Stephen Morse (eds.), Legal, Moral, and Metaphysical Truths: The Philosophy of Michael S. Moore (Oxford)

Abstract:     
This is a draft contribution to a forthcoming fetschrift in Michael S. Moore's honor, to be published by Oxford University Press. The chapter takes on an aspect of Moore's important work on causation in law.

Before one can recover for an injury sounding in negligence, one must establish that the defendant more likely than not proximately caused the injury. That the positive law of negligence imposes this requirement is beyond controversy. What is more controversial is whether the requirement is conceptually and morally defensible. Michael Moore, singly as well as in tandem with Heidi Hurd, powerfully argues that it is neither. Specifically, Moore contends that the harm-within-the-risk test of proximate causation, despite its venerable history in tort law and reaffirmation in the latest Restatement, is “incoherent” and “morally undesirable.” It is bad enough, on Moore’s view, that negligence law bifurcates its causal inquiry, distinguishing as it does the question of actual causation from that of proximate causation, rather than pursuing a unified naturalistic inquiry into the substantiality of causal contribution. What is worse is that tort law can’t even get its own misguided causal inquiry half-right.

I do not share Moore’s jaundiced view of the harm-within-the-risk test of proximate cause – what I will call the “risk rule” for short. I begin by questioning his understanding of the risk rule as it figures in tort law, and go on to argue that neither his conceptual nor his moral criticism of the risk rule is decisive. In the course of rebutting Moore’s criticisms, I outline what I take to be the most compelling account of the risk rule in the law of torts. What emerges is a conception of proximate cause that is thoroughly moralized. Of course moral premises must be invoked to defend the risk rule’s moral merit, but, I argue, they must also be invoked to defend its conceptual coherence. In my view, the risk rule is both morally and conceptually sound.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 29

Keywords: Michael Moore, proximate cause, legal cause, causation, risk, risk rule, harm within the risk, morality

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Date posted: July 20, 2014  

Suggested Citation

Oberdiek, John, Putting (and Keeping) Proximate Cause in Its Place (July 17, 2014). Forthcoming in Kimberly Kessler Ferzan and Stephen Morse (eds.), Legal, Moral, and Metaphysical Truths: The Philosophy of Michael S. Moore (Oxford). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2467783

Contact Information

John Oberdiek (Contact Author)
Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey - School of Law - Camden ( email )
217 N. 5th Street
Camden, NJ 08102-1203
United States
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