Group Strategy-Proofness in Private Good Economies Without Money: Matching, Division and House Allocation

18 Pages Posted: 19 Jul 2014

See all articles by Salvador Barberà

Salvador Barberà

Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona; MOVE; Barcelona School of Economics

Dolors Berga-Colom

University of Girona - Department of Economics

Bernardo Moreno

University of Malaga

Date Written: February 13, 2014

Abstract

We observe that three salient solutions to matching, division and house allocation problems are not only (partially) strategy-proof, but (partially) group strategy-proof as well, in appropriate domains of definition. That is the case for the Gale-Shapley mechanism, the uniform rule and the top trading cycle solution, respectively. We embed these three types of problems into a general framework. We then notice that the three rules, as well as many others, do share a common set of properties, which together imply their (partial) group strategy-proofness. This proves that the equivalence between individual and group strategy-proofness in all these cases is not a fortuitous event, but results from the structure of the functions under consideration.

Keywords: Matching, Division, House allocation, Strategy-proofness, Group strategy-proofness, Group monotonicity, Non-bossiness

JEL Classification: C78, D71, D78

Suggested Citation

Barberà, Salvador and Berga-Colom, Dolors and Moreno, Bernardo, Group Strategy-Proofness in Private Good Economies Without Money: Matching, Division and House Allocation (February 13, 2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2467988 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2467988

Salvador Barberà (Contact Author)

Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona ( email )

Edifici B - Campus Bellaterra
Cerdanyola del Vallès, Barcelolna 08193
Spain
34935811814 (Phone)
34935812012 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://pareto.uab.es/sbarbera/

MOVE ( email )

Campus de Bellaterra-UAB Edifici B (s/n)
EDIFICI B
Cerdanyola del Vallès
, Barcelona 08193
Spain
34935812188 (Phone)
34935812012 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.movebarcelona.eu/

Barcelona School of Economics ( email )

Carrer de Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain

HOME PAGE: http://bse.eu/

Dolors Berga-Colom

University of Girona - Department of Economics ( email )

Campus de Montilivi s/n
Girona, Girona 17071
Spain

Bernardo Moreno

University of Malaga ( email )

Malaga, Málaga 29004
Spain

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