Group Strategy-Proofness in Private Good Economies Without Money: Matching, Division and House Allocation
18 Pages Posted: 19 Jul 2014
Date Written: February 13, 2014
Abstract
We observe that three salient solutions to matching, division and house allocation problems are not only (partially) strategy-proof, but (partially) group strategy-proof as well, in appropriate domains of definition. That is the case for the Gale-Shapley mechanism, the uniform rule and the top trading cycle solution, respectively. We embed these three types of problems into a general framework. We then notice that the three rules, as well as many others, do share a common set of properties, which together imply their (partial) group strategy-proofness. This proves that the equivalence between individual and group strategy-proofness in all these cases is not a fortuitous event, but results from the structure of the functions under consideration.
Keywords: Matching, Division, House allocation, Strategy-proofness, Group strategy-proofness, Group monotonicity, Non-bossiness
JEL Classification: C78, D71, D78
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation