Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=247501
 
 

References (46)



 
 

Citations (182)



 


 



Ownership and Control of German Corporations


Julian R. Franks


London Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Colin Mayer


University of Oxford - Said Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

September 25, 2000


Abstract:     
In a study of the ownership of German corporations, we find a strong relation between board turnover and corporate performance, little association of concentrations of ownership with managerial disciplining and only limited evidence that pyramid structures can be used for control purposes. The static relation of ownership to control in Germany is therefore similar to the UK and US. However, there are marked differences in dynamic relations involving transfers of ownership. There is an active market in share blocks giving rise to changes in control but the gains are limited and accrue solely to the holders of large blocks, not to minority investors. We provide evidence of low overall benefits to control changes and the exploitation of private benefits of control.

Note: Previously titled "Ownership, Control and the Performance of German Corporations"

Number of Pages in PDF File: 62

Keywords: Ownership, control, board turnover, pyramiding, bank control, takeovers

JEL Classification: G32, G34

working papers series


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Date posted: December 29, 2000  

Suggested Citation

Franks, Julian R. and Mayer, Colin, Ownership and Control of German Corporations (September 25, 2000). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=247501 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.247501

Contact Information

Julian R. Franks (Contact Author)
London Business School ( email )
Institute of Finance and Accounting
Sussex Place - Regent's Park
London NW1 4SA
United Kingdom
+44 20 7262 5050 x3449 (Phone)
+44 20 7724 3317 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Colin Mayer
University of Oxford - Said Business School ( email )
Park End Street
Oxford, OX1 1HP
Great Britain
+44 1865 288112 (Phone)
+44 1865 288805 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
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