Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2475959
 


 



Rethinking Compliance


Anne Riley


Independent

D. Daniel Sokol


University of Florida - Levin College of Law; George Washington University Law School Competition Law Center

August 25, 2014

3 J. of Antitrust Enforcement 31 (2015)
University of Florida Levin College of Law Research Paper No. 16-3

Abstract:     
This article addresses optimal deterrence and its limits in the context of creating a more effective mechanism for antitrust compliance to take hold in businesses. We suggest proactive encouragement of compliance programs. Antitrust authorities should work with the business community to create a regulatory scheme that rewards good behavior while punishing bad behavior. To do so, antitrust authorities need to understand how to create and sustain compliance efforts within a company. The proper role of an antitrust compliance program should be to ensure compliance with the law and to promote ethical behaviour by and between companies as part of good corporate governance. Antitrust authorities should play a role in encouraging and supporting this, in the same way other enforcement authorities do (for example in relation to FCPA/anti-bribery enforcement). We argue that from a policy perspective, antitrust enforcement should not just be about punishment but about changing normative values within organizations.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 47

Keywords: compliance, cartels, leniency, antitrust, competition, collusion

JEL Classification: K21, L41, M14


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Date posted: August 5, 2014 ; Last revised: January 18, 2016

Suggested Citation

Riley, Anne and Sokol, D. Daniel, Rethinking Compliance (August 25, 2014). 3 J. of Antitrust Enforcement 31 (2015); University of Florida Levin College of Law Research Paper No. 16-3. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2475959 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2475959

Contact Information

Anne Riley
Independent ( email )
No Address Available
D. Daniel Sokol (Contact Author)
University of Florida - Levin College of Law ( email )
Spessard L. Holland Law Center
P.O. Box 117625
Gainesville, FL 32611-7625
United States
(352) 273-0968 (Phone)
(352) 392-3005 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.ufl.edu/faculty/d-daniel-sokol

George Washington University Law School Competition Law Center ( email )
200 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20052
United States
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