Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2476452
 


 



Limit Pricing and Predation in the Antitrust Laws: Economic and Legal Aspects


Harold See


Belmont University - College of Law

William D. Gunther


University of Alabama

1984

Alabama Law Review, 35 Ala. L. Rev. 211 (1984).

Abstract:     
The overwhelming view in the economic literature is that limit pricing, the practice of establishing a non-profit-maximizing price with the intention of deterring entry of others into the market, either does not make economic sense or, in any event, does not have anticompetitive effects. This article will take a systematic look at the legal status of the limit price doctrine and propose its proper role.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 30

Keywords: Limit Price Doctrine, Limit Pricing, Antitrust

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Date posted: August 6, 2014  

Suggested Citation

See, Harold and Gunther, William D., Limit Pricing and Predation in the Antitrust Laws: Economic and Legal Aspects (1984). Alabama Law Review, 35 Ala. L. Rev. 211 (1984). . Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2476452

Contact Information

Harold See (Contact Author)
Belmont University - College of Law ( email )
1900 Belmont Boulevard
Nashville, TN 37212
United States

William D. Gunther
University of Alabama ( email )
P.O. Box 870244
Tuscaloosa, AL 35487
United States
205-348-8960 (Phone)
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