Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2477125
 


 



City Replanning


Roderick M. Hills, Jr.


New York University School of Law

David Schleicher


George Mason University School of Law

August 6, 2014

George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 14-32

Abstract:     
In this paper we provide a new defense for one of the most criticized ideas in land use law, that city plans should constitute settled deals about the proper uses of land that should be sticky against subsequent zoning amendments. In the middle of the last century, several prominent scholars argued that courts should find zoning amendments that were contrary to city plans ultra vires. But this idea was largely rejected by courts and scholars alike, with leading figures like Carol Rose, Robert Nelson and Bill Fischel arguing that parcel-specific zoning amendments provide space for the give-and-take of democracy and lead to the efficient amount of development by encouraging negotiations between developers and residents over externalities from new building projects. Their case against plans and in favor of deals suggested that zoning authorities act either as arbiters in land use disputes or as agents for existing residents to encourage negotiated solutions.

We argue, by contrast, that the dismissal of plans was shortsighted and has helped contribute to the excessive strictness of zoning in our richest and most productive cities and regions, which has driven up housing prices excessively and produced outcomes that are economically inefficient and distributively unattractive. In contrast with both planning’s critics and supporters, we argue that plans and comprehensive remappings are best understood as deals. Plans and remappings facilitate trades between city councilmembers who understand the need for new development but refuse to have their neighborhoods be dumping grounds for all new construction. Further, by setting forth what can be constructed as of right, plans reduce the information costs borne by purchasers of land and developers, broadening the market for new construction. We argue that land use law should embrace a version of plans as a procedural tool that packages together policies and sets of zoning changes in a number of neighborhoods simultaneously through procedures that make such packages difficult to unwind.

We conclude by arguing that modern property law scholarship has failed to recognize that real property law is now substantially a public law subject and should be studied using the tools of public law. Leading scholars, most notably Tom Merrill and Henry Smith, have developed sophisticated tools for analyzing the ways in which the common law of property is designed to reduce information costs, which we employ here. But the field has ignored the fact that the common law of property is far less important than it once was as a method for regulating real property ownership and use. Legislatures and administrative agencies at a variety of levels determine most of the rules governing how real property is used and purchased. In order to understand how today’s property law increases or reduces the information costs facing owners, users, potential purchasers and third-parties to property, the field must make an “institutional turn,” studying the likely effects on policy of different institutional arrangements and procedures.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 69

Keywords: aldermanic privilege, binding plan, citywide bargain, information cost, institutions, land use, legislature, mapping, marketability, mayor, NIMBY, party competition, planning, property law, public law, real estate, sticky, zoning, zoning budget

JEL Classification: H70, K11, R14

working papers series





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Date posted: August 7, 2014 ; Last revised: August 9, 2014

Suggested Citation

Hills, Jr., Roderick M. and Schleicher, David, City Replanning (August 6, 2014). George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 14-32. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2477125

Contact Information

Roderick Maltman Hills
New York University School of Law ( email )
40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
David Schleicher (Contact Author)
George Mason University School of Law ( email )
3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States
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