Health Club Attendance, Expectations and Self-Control

24 Pages Posted: 21 Aug 2014

See all articles by Jean-Denis Garon

Jean-Denis Garon

University of Quebec at Montreal (UQAM) - Faculty of Management (ESG)

Alix Masse

ESG UQAM

Pierre-Carl Michaud

University of Quebec at Montreal (UQAM) - Department of Economics; Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques Economiques et l'Emploi (CIRPÉE); RAND Corporation, Labor and Population; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Netspar

Date Written: July 31, 2014

Abstract

Using a unique dataset on health club attendance from Quebec, we look at the relationship between actual and expected attendance and how these relate to a reported measure of self-control problems at the time of contract signing. We find that a large majority of contract choices appear inconsistent purely on financial grounds: 47.5% of members would be better off paying the fee for a single visit each time they go to the gym rather than signing a long-term contract. The median total cost of making a mistake on this decision is $262. We then compute that almost all members have made the right decision once we use subjective expectations of the number of visits per week at the time of contract choice. Next, we study how actual attendance following contract choice is related to baseline reports of self-control. We find that reports of self-control problems at baseline are associated with low future attendance and that attendance decreases faster, in particular after New Year. Finally, those with a large gap between expected and realized attendance have a much lower probability of contract renewal. Our results are consistent with a model of health club participation where agents underestimate the severity of their self-control problems.

Keywords: self-control, gym attendance, expectations, obesity

JEL Classification: D000, D120, D910

Suggested Citation

Garon, Jean-Denis and Masse, Alix and Michaud, Pierre-Carl, Health Club Attendance, Expectations and Self-Control (July 31, 2014). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4926, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2483713 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2483713

Jean-Denis Garon

University of Quebec at Montreal (UQAM) - Faculty of Management (ESG) ( email )

Case postale 8888
Succursale Centre-ville
Montreal, Quebec H3C 3P8
Canada

Alix Masse

ESG UQAM

315 St. Catherine Street East
Montreal, Quebec H2X 3X2
Canada

Pierre-Carl Michaud (Contact Author)

University of Quebec at Montreal (UQAM) - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 8888, Downtown Station
Montreal, Quebec H3C 3P8
Canada

Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques Economiques et l'Emploi (CIRPÉE) ( email )

Pavillon De Sève
Ste-Foy, Quebec G1K 7P4
Canada

RAND Corporation, Labor and Population ( email )

Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138
United States

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Netspar ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

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