Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2484738
 


 



Competition Policy in Selection Markets


Neale Mahoney


University of Chicago Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Andre Veiga


University of Oxford - Nuffield College

E. Glen Weyl


Microsoft Research New England; University of Chicago

August 21, 2014

CPI Antitrust Chronicle Submission, August 2014

Abstract:     
Selection markets, like insurance and finance, where the value of customers depends on their identity, create fundamental challenges for competition policy. Competition is often harmful in these markets either by creating socially excessive supply or leading to degradation of product quality. Standard indicators used to gauge policies, such as upward pricing pressure, are also often mis-calibrated in these settings. We summarize for a policy audience and draw competition policy conclusions from two recent papers on the interaction between competition policy and selection, using calibrations to sub-prime auto lending and health insurance.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 9

Keywords: competition policy, selection markets, cream-skimming, merger analysis, sub-prime lending, health insurance

JEL Classification: D40, D82, G20, I11, K21, L41

working papers series





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Date posted: August 23, 2014  

Suggested Citation

Mahoney, Neale and Veiga, Andre and Weyl, E. Glen, Competition Policy in Selection Markets (August 21, 2014). CPI Antitrust Chronicle Submission, August 2014. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2484738 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2484738

Contact Information

Neale Mahoney
University of Chicago Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 South Woodlawn Ave
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773.702.9278 (Phone)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Andre Veiga
University of Oxford - Nuffield College ( email )
New Road
Oxford, OX1 1NF
United Kingdom
HOME PAGE: http://www.andreveiga.com
Eric Glen Weyl (Contact Author)
Microsoft Research New England ( email )
One Memorial Drive, 14th Floor
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
(857) 998-4513 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.glenweyl.com
University of Chicago ( email )
1126 East 59th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
(773) 702-4862 (Phone)
(773) 702-8490 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.glenweyl.com
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