Politics as a Peculiar Business: The Universal Logic of Economizing Action

Politics as a Peculiar Business: Public Choice in a System of Entangled Political Economy, Forthcoming

GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 14-25

39 Pages Posted: 5 Sep 2014

See all articles by Richard E. Wagner

Richard E. Wagner

George Mason University - Department of Economics; George Mason University - Mercatus Center

Date Written: September 3, 2014

Abstract

This is a preliminary draft of the fifth of what will be eight chapters in a book titled Politics as a Peculiar Business: Public Choice in a System of Entangled Political Economy. This chapter explains that economizing action provides a universal form for pursuing social theorizing in a substantive manner. People universally act to options they value most highly, but only a subset of those options has directly logical character. Much action has non-logical character, as illustrated by sentiments of various sorts, and yet such action is likewise has regularity about it and is subject to scientific examination.

Keywords: economizing action; behavioral economics; logical vs. non-logical action; cost and choice; sentiments and reason; Vilfredo Pareto

JEL Classification: B31, B40, D10, D70

Suggested Citation

Wagner, Richard E., Politics as a Peculiar Business: The Universal Logic of Economizing Action (September 3, 2014). Politics as a Peculiar Business: Public Choice in a System of Entangled Political Economy, Forthcoming, GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 14-25, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2491121

Richard E. Wagner (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )

4400 University Drive
334 Enterprise Hall
Fairfax, VA 22030
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(703) 993-1132 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://mason.gmu.edu/~rwagner/

George Mason University - Mercatus Center ( email )

3434 Washington Blvd., 4th Floor
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

HOME PAGE: http://ppe.mercatus.org/scholars/richard-wagner

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