Selling Cookies

42 Pages Posted: 9 Sep 2014

See all articles by Dirk Bergemann

Dirk Bergemann

Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics; Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Alessandro Bonatti

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management

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Date Written: September 8, 2014

Abstract

We propose a model of data provision and data pricing. A single data provider controls a large database that contains information about the match value between individual consumers and individual firms (advertisers). Advertisers seek to tailor their spending to the individual match value. The data provider prices queries about individual consumers' characteristics (cookies). We determine the equilibrium data acquisition and pricing policies. Advertisers choose positive and/or negative targeting policies. The optimal query price influences the composition of the targeted set. The price of data decreases with the reach of the database and increases with the fragmentation of data sales.

Keywords: Data providers, Data pricing, Selling information, Targeting, Online advertising, Cookies, Media markets

JEL Classification: D44, D82, D83

Suggested Citation

Bergemann, Dirk and Bonatti, Alessandro, Selling Cookies (September 8, 2014). Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1920RR, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2493124 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2493124

Dirk Bergemann (Contact Author)

Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~dirk/

Yale University - Cowles Foundation

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New Haven, CT 06520-8281
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Alessandro Bonatti

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )

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Cambridge, MA 02142
United States

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