Power and Fairness in a Generalized Ultimatum Game

PLoS ONE 9(6), 2014, DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0099039

22 Pages Posted: 14 Sep 2014

See all articles by Giovanni Luca Ciampaglia

Giovanni Luca Ciampaglia

Indiana University Bloomington - School of Informatics and Computing

Sergi Lozano

Rovira i Virgili University

Dirk Helbing

ETH Zürich - Department of Humanities, Social and Political Sciences (GESS)

Date Written: September 12, 2014

Abstract

Power is the ability to influence others towards the attainment of specific goals, and it is a fundamental force that shapes behavior at all levels of human existence. Several theories on the nature of power in social life exist, especially in the context of social influence. Yet, in bargaining situations, surprisingly little is known about its role in shaping social preferences. Such preferences are considered to be the main explanation for observed behavior in a wide range of experimental settings. In this work, we set out to understand the role of bargaining power in the stylized environment of a Generalized Ultimatum Game (GUG). We modify the payoff structure of the standard Ultimatum Game (UG) to investigate three situations: two in which the power balance is either against the proposer or against the responder, and a balanced situation. We find that other regarding preferences, as measured by the amount of money donated by participants, do not change with the amount of power, but power changes the offers and acceptance rates systematically. Notably, unusually high acceptance rates for lower offers were observed. This finding suggests that social preferences may be invariant to the balance of power and confirms that the role of power on human behavior deserves more attention.

Suggested Citation

Ciampaglia, Giovanni Luca and Lozano, Sergi and Helbing, Dirk, Power and Fairness in a Generalized Ultimatum Game (September 12, 2014). PLoS ONE 9(6), 2014, DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0099039, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2495498

Giovanni Luca Ciampaglia (Contact Author)

Indiana University Bloomington - School of Informatics and Computing ( email )

901 E 10th St
Bloomington, IN 47401
United States

Sergi Lozano

Rovira i Virgili University ( email )

Campus Sescelades, Carretera de Valls s/n
43006 Tarragona, Tarragona 43007
Spain

Dirk Helbing

ETH Zürich - Department of Humanities, Social and Political Sciences (GESS) ( email )

ETH Zurich - Swiss Federal Institute of Technology
Clausiusstrasse 50
Zurich, 8092
Switzerland

HOME PAGE: http://www.coss.ethz.ch

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