Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=249585
 
 

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Information Complements, Substitutes, and Strategic Product Design


Geoffrey Parker


Tulane University - A.B. Freeman School of Business

Marshall W. Van Alstyne


Boston University - Department of Management Information Systems; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School

November 8, 2000


Abstract:     
Competitive maneuvering in the information economy has raised a pressing question: how can firms raise profits by giving away products for free? This paper provides a possible answer and articulates a strategy space for information product design. Free strategic complements can raise a firm's own profits while free strategic substitutes can lower profits for competitors.

We introduce a formal model of two-sided market externalities based in textbook economics -- a mix of Katz & Shapiro network effects, price discrimination, and product differentiation -- that leads to novel strategies such as an eagerness to enter into Bertrand price competition. This combination helps to explain many recent firm strategies such as those of Microsoft, Netscape (AOL), Sun, Adobe, and ID.

The model presented here argues for three simple and intuitive results. First, a firm can rationally invest in a product it intends to give away into perpetuity even in the absence of competition. Second, we identify distinct markets for content-providers and end-consumers and show that either can be a candidate for the free good. Third, a firm can use strategic product design to penetrate a market that becomes competitive post-entry. The model therefore helps to explain several interesting market behaviors such as free goods, upgrade paths, split versioning, and strategic information substitutes.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 44

Keywords: free information, complements, substitutes, network effects, network externality, pricing, bundling, two-sided markets, two sided networks

JEL Classification: D4, L0, L1, L2

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Date posted: December 11, 2000 ; Last revised: January 1, 2014

Suggested Citation

Parker, Geoffrey and Van Alstyne, Marshall W., Information Complements, Substitutes, and Strategic Product Design (November 8, 2000). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=249585 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.249585

Contact Information

Geoffrey Parker (Contact Author)
Tulane University - A.B. Freeman School of Business ( email )
7 McAlister Drive
New Orleans, LA 70118
United States
504-865-5000 (Phone)
504-865-6751 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://ggparker.net
Marshall W. Van Alstyne
Boston University - Department of Management Information Systems ( email )
595 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States
617-358-3571 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://smgapps.bu.edu/mgmt_new/profiles/VanAlstyneMarshall.html
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School ( email )
Center for Digital Business
5 Cambridge Center - NE25, 7th Floor
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-0768 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://web.mit.edu/marshall/www/home.html
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