Shifting Blame? Experimental Evidence on Delegating Communication

Posted: 20 Sep 2014 Last revised: 4 Dec 2017

See all articles by Orsola Garofalo

Orsola Garofalo

Copenhagen Business School

Christina Rott

VU University Amsterdam

Date Written: January 25, 2017

Abstract

Decision makers frequently have a spokesperson communicate their decisions. In this paper we address two questions. First, does it matter who communicates an unfair decision? Second, does it matter how the unfair decision is communicated? We conduct a modified dictator game experiment in which either the decision maker or a spokesperson communicates the decided allocation to recipients, who then determine whether to punish either of them. We find that receivers punish both the decision maker and the spokesperson more often, and more heavily, for unfair allocations communicated by the spokesperson if there is room for shifting blame. The increased punishment results from the messenger’s style of delivery: spokespersons are more likely than decision makers to express emotional regret instead of rational need. Receivers seem to punish the former style of communication because they view it as an attempt to shift blame. Our results establish more generally that the design of communication schemes shapes relationships among organizational members.

Keywords: delegation, communication, punishment

JEL Classification: C91, D63, D83

Suggested Citation

Garofalo, Orsola and Rott, Christina, Shifting Blame? Experimental Evidence on Delegating Communication (January 25, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2498251 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2498251

Orsola Garofalo

Copenhagen Business School ( email )

Solbjerg Plads 3
Frederiksberg C, DK - 2000
Denmark

Christina Rott (Contact Author)

VU University Amsterdam ( email )

Netherlands

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