Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2504507
 


 



Invalid But Infringed? An Analysis of Germany's Bifurcated Patent Litigation System


Katrin Cremers


Center for European Economic Research (ZEW)

Fabian Gaessler


Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition

Dietmar Harhoff


Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition; Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Christian Helmers


Santa Clara University - Leavey School of Business; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

September 13, 2014

Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 14-14

Abstract:     
We analyze the impact of the probabilistic nature of patents on the functioning of Germany’s bifurcated patent litigation system where infringement and validity of a patent are decided independently by different courts. We show that bifurcation creates situations in which a patent is held infringed that is subsequently invalidated. Our conservative estimates indicate that 12% of infringement cases in which the patent’s validity is challenged produce such ‘invalid but infringed’ decisions. We also show that having to challenge a patent’s validity in separate court proceedings means that more resource-constrained alleged infringers are less likely to do so. We find evidence that ‘invalid but infringed’ decisions create uncertainty which firms that were found to infringe an invalid patent attempt to reduce by filing more oppositions against newly granted patents immediately afterwards.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 41

Keywords: Litigation, innovation, patents, bifurcation, Germany


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Date posted: October 23, 2014  

Suggested Citation

Cremers, Katrin and Gaessler, Fabian and Harhoff, Dietmar and Helmers, Christian, Invalid But Infringed? An Analysis of Germany's Bifurcated Patent Litigation System (September 13, 2014). Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 14-14. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2504507 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2504507

Contact Information

Katrin Cremers
Center for European Economic Research (ZEW) ( email )
P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1 D-68161 Mannheim
Germany
Fabian Gaessler (Contact Author)
Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition ( email )
Marstallplatz 1
Munich, 80539
Germany
Dietmar Harhoff
Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition ( email )
Marstallplatz 1
Munich, 80539
Germany
+49 89 24246 550 (Phone)
+49 89 24246 599 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.ip.mpg.de

Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München ( email )
Munich, 80539
Germany
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Christian Helmers
Santa Clara University - Leavey School of Business ( email )
500 El Camino Real
Santa Clara, CA California 95053
United States
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid ( email )
CL. de Madrid 126
Madrid, Madrid 28903
Spain
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