Whistling in Silence: The Implications of Arbitration on Qui Tam Claims Under the False Claims Act

66 Pages Posted: 24 Oct 2014 Last revised: 6 Mar 2017

See all articles by Mathew Andrews

Mathew Andrews

Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello PC

Date Written: August 1, 2014

Abstract

For nearly twenty years, corporate defendants have sought unsuccessfully to use arbitration to roll back protections for whistleblowers suing under federal law. The state and federal judiciaries have long stymied these efforts, on the grounds that defendants cannot force the Government’s claims into the secretive forum of arbitration. In January 2013, this protection came to an end. A federal court ruled for the first time that a whistleblower suing on behalf of the United States must pursue its action in arbitration. Five months later, this trend continued as federal courts have compelled arbitration of state law qui tam actions This article argues that while the courts foundered in their reasoning, their holdings were legally correct based on Supreme Court case law and a legislative loophole in the Dodd-Frank Amendments of 2010. As a result, arbitration could fundamentally alter the way that whistleblower actions are investigated and prosecuted, and may blunt what has been described as the “government’s primary litigation tool for recovering losses sustained as the result of fraud.”

Keywords: Qui tam, PAGA, Iskanian, False Claims Act, Arbitration, Federal Arbitration Act, Assignments, Alternative Dispute Resolution, Dodd-Frank, Whistleblower, Fraud

Suggested Citation

Andrews, Mathew, Whistling in Silence: The Implications of Arbitration on Qui Tam Claims Under the False Claims Act (August 1, 2014). Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2513883

Mathew Andrews (Contact Author)

Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello PC ( email )

565 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY 10017
United States

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