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http://ssrn.com/abstract=251584
 
 

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The Uncertain Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and Wage Secrecy


Li Gan


Texas A&M University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

September 2000


Abstract:     
In this paper, we introduce uncertainty into Akerlof and Yellen (1990)'s fair wage effort hypothesis. In this uncertain fair wage hypothesis, employers do not have perfect information concerning an employee's perception of a fair wage, but assume the perceived fair wage is distributed as a random variable with a known distribution. Our wage model, built on this hypothesis, can be applied to analyze the widely adopted policy of wage secrecy.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 13

Keywords: Uncertainty, Fairness, Wage Secrecy

JEL Classification: J3

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Date posted: January 4, 2001  

Suggested Citation

Gan, Li, The Uncertain Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and Wage Secrecy (September 2000). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=251584 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.251584

Contact Information

Li Gan (Contact Author)
Texas A&M University (TAMU) - Department of Economics ( email )
5201 University Blvd.
College Station, TX 77843-4228
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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