Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2517957
 


 



The Revolving-Door of Sell-Side Analysts: A Threat to Analysts’ Independence?


Ben Lourie


University of California, Irvine

November 13, 2014


Abstract:     
The “revolving-door” phenomenon whereby analysts are hired by firms that they cover poses a threat to their independence. In this paper, I document this phenomenon and assess the extent to which it is associated with analysts’ issuance of biased research reports during the year prior to their employment with the covered firms. During this final year, I find that the revolving-door analysts alter their forecasts, target prices and recommendations in a direction which suggests that they are attempting to gain favor with their would-be employers. Specifically, relative to other analysts, they become more optimistic about the firms that end up hiring them while, at the same time, becoming more pessimistic about other firms’ prospects. The findings raise concerns about their independence and indicate a potential benefit to tightening employment regulations in this industry.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 54

Keywords: Revolving door, analyst conflict of interests

JEL Classification: M4


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Date posted: November 6, 2014 ; Last revised: November 14, 2014

Suggested Citation

Lourie, Ben, The Revolving-Door of Sell-Side Analysts: A Threat to Analysts’ Independence? (November 13, 2014). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2517957 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2517957

Contact Information

Ben Lourie (Contact Author)
University of California, Irvine ( email )
Irvine, CA 92697-3125
United States
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