Daddy Months

22 Pages Posted: 4 Nov 2014

See all articles by Volker Meier

Volker Meier

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich

Helmut Rainer

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - Ifo Institute

Date Written: October 23, 2014

Abstract

We consider a bargaining model in which husband and wife decide on the allocation of time and disposable income. Since her bargaining power would go down otherwise more strongly, the wife agrees to have a child only if the husband also leaves the labor market for a while. The daddy months subsidy enables the couple to overcome a hold-up problem and thereby improves efficiency. However, the same ruling harms cooperative couples and may also reduce welfare in an endogenous taxation framework.

Keywords: fertility, bargaining, family policy, labor supply

JEL Classification: D13, H21, J13, J18, J22

Suggested Citation

Meier, Volker and Rainer, Helmut, Daddy Months (October 23, 2014). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5033, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2518957 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2518957

Volker Meier (Contact Author)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich ( email )

Poschingerstr. 5
Munich
Germany

Helmut Rainer

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - Ifo Institute ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, 01069
Germany

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