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http://ssrn.com/abstract=252760
 
 

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A Theory of Transactions Privacy


Charles M. Kahn


University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

James McAndrews


Federal Reserve Bank of New York

William Roberds


Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta

November 2000

FRB Atlanta Working Paper No. 2000-22

Abstract:     
In this paper, we consider the costs and benefits of transactions privacy. In the environment we consider, privacy is the concealment of potentially useful information, but concealment also potentially bestows benefits. In some versions of the environment, the standard Coasian logic applies: given an unambiguous initial assignment of rights and sufficient flexibility in contracting, efficiency in information revelation will result. Coasian bargaining may be impeded, however, by either an inability to make certain commitments or by the presence of significant investments that must be made before the transaction occurs. In such cases, initial assignments of rights (for example, privacy laws) can have consequences for efficiency.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 29

Keywords: Privacy, transactions, Internet, e-money

JEL Classification: D80, G28

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Date posted: January 19, 2001  

Suggested Citation

Kahn, Charles M. and McAndrews, James and Roberds, William, A Theory of Transactions Privacy (November 2000). FRB Atlanta Working Paper No. 2000-22. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=252760 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.252760

Contact Information

Charles M. Kahn
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign ( email )
Department of Finance
340 Wohlers Hall
Champaign, IL 61820
United States
217-333-2813 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://kahnfrance.com/cmk/
James McAndrews
Federal Reserve Bank of New York ( email )
33 Liberty Street
New York, NY 10045
United States
212-720-5063 (Phone)
212-720-8353 (Fax)
William Roberds (Contact Author)
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ( email )
1000 Peachtree Street N.E.
Atlanta, GA 30309-4470
United States
404-498-8970 (Phone)
404-498-8956 (Fax)
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