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Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction-Theoretic Approach

Michael R. Baye
Indiana University Bloomington - Department of Business Economics & Public Policy

Dan Kovenock
University of Iowa; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Casper G. De Vries
Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE); Tinbergen Institute; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

November 2000

CESifo Working Paper No. 373

Abstract:
A simple auction-theoretic framework is used to examine symmetric litigation environments where the legal ownership of a disputed asset is unknown by the court. The court observes only the quality of the case presented by each party, and awards the asset to the party presenting the best case. Rational litigants influence the quality of their cases by hiring skillful attorneys. This framework permits us to compare the equilibrium legal expenditures that arise under a continuum of legal systems. The British rule, American rule, and some recently proposed legal reforms are special cases of our model.

Keywords: Auctions, contests, litigation, fee-shifting

JEL Classifications: D8, K4

Working Paper Series

Date posted: January 28, 2001 ; Last revised: July 22, 2005

Suggested Citation

Baye, Michael R., Kovenock, Dan and De Vries, Casper G., Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction-Theoretic Approach (November 2000). CESifo Working Paper No. 373. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=254512

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Contact Information

Casper De Vries (Contact Author) Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) ( email ) P.O. Box 1738 3000 DR Rotterdam NL 3062 PA Netherlands +31 10 408 8956 (Phone) +31 10 408 9147 (Fax)
Tinbergen Institute Burg. Oudlaan 50 Rotterdam 3062 PA Netherlands +31 10 408 8956 (Phone) +31 10 408 9147 (Fax)
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research) Poschinger Str. 5 DE-81679 Munich Germany HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de
Michael Roy Baye Indiana University Bloomington - Department of Business Economics & Public Policy ( email ) Bloomington, IN 47405 United States 812-855-2779 (Phone) 812-855-3354 (Fax)
Dan Kovenock University of Iowa ( email ) Iowa City, IA 52242-1097 United States
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research) Poschinger Str. 5 DE-81679 Munich Germany HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

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