Amakudari and Japanese Law

Michigan State International Law Review, Vol 22, No. 3, 2014

82 Pages Posted: 23 Aug 2016 Last revised: 4 Sep 2017

See all articles by Colin P.A. Jones

Colin P.A. Jones

Doshisha University - Faculty of Law; Duke University School of Law

Date Written: September 1, 2013

Abstract

This paper describes all the ways in which amakudari, the practice of bureaucrats retiring into industry, quasi-governmental organizations or other sectors (including the legal professions) manifests itself in the Japanese legal system. Starting with a general discussion of amakudari, the paper proceeds to identify the specific legal mechanisms by which it is accomplished. A discussion of Japan's multivarious legal professions (broadly defined and including several not identified in prior literature on the subject) is used to first identify the way most of them are structured to offer post-retirement employment opportunities to the ministries having jurisdiction over them the exemptions from the very competitive testing requirements or registration privileges. This is followed by a discussion of various public and quasi-public sector entities of questionable value have come to acquire significant assets and also serve as retirement destinations. Examples of statutory regimes that make such entities part of a regulatory regime that essentially force businesses to pay them money in the form of certification fees are also given.

Keywords: Japanese Law, Amakudari, Legal Professions, Lawyer, Bengoshi, Judicial Scrivener, Administrative Scrivener, Corruption

JEL Classification: K49

Suggested Citation

Jones, Colin P.A., Amakudari and Japanese Law (September 1, 2013). Michigan State International Law Review, Vol 22, No. 3, 2014, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2547387 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2547387

Colin P.A. Jones (Contact Author)

Doshisha University - Faculty of Law ( email )

Kyoto
Japan

Duke University School of Law ( email )

210 Science Drive
Box 90362
Durham, NC 27708
United States

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