SSRN Home Search and Download Papers Browse Abstract and Paper Submission Subscribe to Networks View Briefcase Top Papers Top Authors Top Institutions

 

Abstract

 
 

References (118)

Beta

 
 

Citations (137)

Beta

 


 


Download | Share | Email | Add to Briefcase | Buy Hard Copy

Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity - Evidence and Economic Applications

Ernst Fehr
Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW), University of Zurich

Klaus M. Schmidt
Ludwig Maximilians University of Munich - Faculty of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)


December 23, 2000

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 403; University of Zurich, IEER Working Paper No. 75

Abstract:     
Most economic models are based on the self-interest hypothesis that assumes that all people are exclusively motivated by their material self-interest. In recent years experimental economists have gathered overwhelming evidence that systematically refutes the self-interest hypothesis and suggests that many people are strongly motivated by concerns for fairness and reciprocity. Moreover, several theoretical papers have been written showing that the observed phenomena can be explained in a rigorous and tractable manner. These theories in turn induced a new wave of experimental research offering additional exciting insights into the nature of preferences and into the relative performance of competing theories of fairness. The purpose of this paper is to review these recent developments, to point out open questions, and to suggest avenues for future research.

Keywords: Behavioral Economics, Fairness, Reciprocity, Altruism, Experiments, Incentives, Contracts, Competition

JEL Classifications: C7, C9, D0, J3

Working Paper Series

Date posted: February 09, 2001 ; Last revised: August 10, 2004

Contact Information

Klaus M. Schmidt (Contact Author)
Ludwig Maximilians University of Munich - Faculty of Economics ( email )
Ludwigstrasse 28
D-80539 Munich Germany
+49 89 2180 3405 (Phone)
+49 89 2180 3510 (Fax)
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
Poschinger Str. 5
DE-81679 Munich Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
90-98 Goswell Road
London EC1V 7RR United Kingdom
Ernst Fehr
Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW), University of Zurich ( email )
Bluemlisalpstrasse 10
CH-8006 Zurich 8006
Switzerland
+41 1 634 3709 (Phone)
+41 1 634 4907 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 2,494
Downloads: 764
Download Rank: 7,069
References: 118
Citations: 137
People who downloaded
this paper also downloaded:

1. Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity
By Ernst Fehr and Simon Gächter

© 2009 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Terms of Use  Privacy Policy
This page was served by apollo4 in 2.469 seconds.