Optimal Spatial Taxation: Are Big Cities Too Small?

44 Pages Posted: 23 Jan 2015

See all articles by Jan Eeckhout

Jan Eeckhout

University College London - Department of Economics

Nezih Guner

ICREA-MOVE; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 2015

Abstract

We analyze the role of optimal income taxation across different local labor markets. Should labor in large cities be taxed differently than in small cities? We find that a planner who needs to raise revenue and is constrained by free mobility of labor across cities does not choose equal taxes for cities of different sizes. The optimal tax schedule is location specific and tax differences between large and small cities depends on the level of government spending and on the concentration of housing wealth. Our estimates for the US implies higher marginal rates in big cities, but lower than what is observed. Simulating the US economy under the optimal tax schedule, there are large effects on population mobility: the fraction of population in the 5 largest cities grows by 8.0% with 3.5% of the country-wide population moving to bigger cities. The welfare gains however are smaller. Aggregate consumption goes up by 1.53%. This is due to the fact that much of the output gains are spent on the increased costs of housing construction in bigger cities. Aggregate housing consumption goes down by 1.75%.

Keywords: city size, general equilibrium, misallocation, population mobility, taxation

JEL Classification: H21, J61, R12, R13

Suggested Citation

Eeckhout, Jan and Guner, Nezih, Optimal Spatial Taxation: Are Big Cities Too Small? (January 2015). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10352, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2554426

Jan Eeckhout (Contact Author)

University College London - Department of Economics ( email )

30 Gordon Street
London WC1E 6BT, WC1H 0AX
United Kingdom

Nezih Guner

ICREA-MOVE ( email )

Campus de Bellaterra-UAB Edifici B (s/n)
EDIFICI B
Cerdanyola del Vallès
, Barcelona 08193
Spain

Autonomous University of Barcelona ( email )

Plaça Cívica
Cerdañola del Valles
Barcelona, Barcelona 08193
Spain

Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, Barcelona 08005
Spain

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