Neoliberalism and Work-Related Risk: Individual or Collective Responsibilization?

Journal of Risk Research, 16 (10), 1209-1224 (2013)

30 Pages Posted: 29 Jan 2015

See all articles by Peter Mascini

Peter Mascini

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Law; Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Faculty of Social Sciences

Peter Achterberg

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Faculty of Social Sciences

Dick Houtman

Independent

Date Written: June 26, 2013

Abstract

Based on a representative sample of the Dutch population (N=2,467) we test four hypotheses about how utilitarian individualism influences the responsibilization of work-related risks. The risk-society hypothesis understands utilitarian individualism as a laisser-faire ideological orientation and assumes it to lead to individual responsibilization. The blame-culture hypothesis conceives utilitarian individualists as consumer-citizens and predicts the reverse – that those concerned expect to be protected by the government. The resentment hypothesis assumes that particularly utilitarian individualists with a vulnerable labour-market position individualize responsibility, because they distrust those who share their fate more than others do. The narcissism hypothesis reverses this logic, because it assumes that utilitarian individualists’ narcissistic self-centeredness entices them to make others responsible for their own risks. The two hypotheses predicting an individualization of work-related risk due to utilitarian individualism are both confirmed, whereas the two hypotheses predicting it to result in their collectivization are both rejected.

Keywords: culture of blame, narcissism, neoliberalism, reflexive modernization, resentment, utilitarian individualism, work-related risks

JEL Classification: A14, D63

Suggested Citation

Mascini, Peter and Achterberg, Peter and Houtman, Dick, Neoliberalism and Work-Related Risk: Individual or Collective Responsibilization? (June 26, 2013). Journal of Risk Research, 16 (10), 1209-1224 (2013), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2555825

Peter Mascini (Contact Author)

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Law ( email )

Office: Sanders building, L7-23
3000 DR Rotterdam, 3000 DR
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0031 622498090 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.eur.nl/people/peter-mascini/

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Faculty of Social Sciences ( email )

Mandeville building, T7-18
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands
0031622498090 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.eur.nl/people/peter-mascini/

Peter Achterberg

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Faculty of Social Sciences ( email )

Burgemeester Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062
Netherlands

Dick Houtman

Independent

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