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Why Law, Economics, and Organization?

Oliver E. Williamson

University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group

December 2000

UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 37

It being the case that law and economics is a success story, what are the reasons to call upon organization? Three related reasons are advanced here.

First, the orthodox theory of the firm-as-production function is self-limiting and needs, for some purposes, to be joined with the theory of the firm-as-governance structure. Organization theory makes essential contributions to that project. Second, such a move has lessons for public policy analysis. Earlier and ongoing errors in antitrust and regulation are flagged and can be avoided as a consequence. And third, the traditional approach to teaching contract in the law school is reshaped if attention is shifted away from adjudication to focus predominantly on governance - as it should be.

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Date posted: January 12, 2001  

Suggested Citation

Williamson, Oliver E., Why Law, Economics, and Organization? (December 2000). UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 37. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=255624 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.255624

Contact Information

Oliver E. Williamson (Contact Author)
University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group ( email )
545 Student Services Building
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
510-642-8697 (Phone)
510-642-4700 (Fax)
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