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File name: SSRN-id255624. ; Size: 179K
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Why Law, Economics, and Organization?
Oliver E. Williamson
University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group
December 2000
UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 37
Abstract:
It being the case that law and economics is a success story, what are the reasons to call upon organization? Three related reasons are advanced here.
First, the orthodox theory of the firm-as-production function is self-limiting and needs, for some purposes, to be joined with the theory of the firm-as-governance structure. Organization theory makes essential contributions to that project. Second, such a move has lessons for public policy analysis. Earlier and ongoing errors in antitrust and regulation are flagged and can be avoided as a consequence. And third, the traditional approach to teaching contract in the law school is reshaped if attention is shifted away from adjudication to focus predominantly on governance - as it should be.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 48
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Date posted: January 12, 2001
Suggested CitationWilliamson, Oliver E., Why Law, Economics, and Organization? (December 2000). UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 37. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=255624 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.255624
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