Courts and the Puzzle of Institutional Stability and Change: Administrative Drift and Judicial Innovation in the Case of Asbestos
Political Research Quarterly, 61(4) (December 2008): 636-648
14 Pages Posted: 30 Jan 2015
Date Written: December 1, 2008
Abstract
The institutional development literature has begun to move beyond the concept of punctuated equilibrium and consider how the forces of stability and change interact. A central theme involves drift — the shifting of the effect of stable institutions through changing circumstances. This article uses the case of asbestos injury compensation to highlight how the very features of American government that make drift likely also promise to displace it, as courts step in when Congress fails to act. The broader implication is that drift is best understood as a transitional stage of development, not a dominant mode of change, in fragmented policy-making systems with multiple access points.
Keywords: courts, institutional development, American political development, asbestos, mass tort
JEL Classification: K00, K13, K40, K41
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation