Courts and the Puzzle of Institutional Stability and Change: Administrative Drift and Judicial Innovation in the Case of Asbestos

Political Research Quarterly, 61(4) (December 2008): 636-648

14 Pages Posted: 30 Jan 2015

See all articles by Jeb Barnes

Jeb Barnes

University of Southern California - Department of Political Science

Date Written: December 1, 2008

Abstract

The institutional development literature has begun to move beyond the concept of punctuated equilibrium and consider how the forces of stability and change interact. A central theme involves drift — the shifting of the effect of stable institutions through changing circumstances. This article uses the case of asbestos injury compensation to highlight how the very features of American government that make drift likely also promise to displace it, as courts step in when Congress fails to act. The broader implication is that drift is best understood as a transitional stage of development, not a dominant mode of change, in fragmented policy-making systems with multiple access points.

Keywords: courts, institutional development, American political development, asbestos, mass tort

JEL Classification: K00, K13, K40, K41

Suggested Citation

Barnes, Jeb, Courts and the Puzzle of Institutional Stability and Change: Administrative Drift and Judicial Innovation in the Case of Asbestos (December 1, 2008). Political Research Quarterly, 61(4) (December 2008): 636-648, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2557045

Jeb Barnes (Contact Author)

University of Southern California - Department of Political Science ( email )

2250 Alcazar Street
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States

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