Reciprocity in Organisations - Evidence from the WERS

36 Pages Posted: 4 Feb 2015

See all articles by Florian Englmaier

Florian Englmaier

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) - Faculty of Economics

Thomas Kolaska

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU)

Stephen Leider

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business

Date Written: January 30, 2015

Abstract

Recent laboratory evidence suggests that social preferences may affect contractual outcomes under moral hazard. In accordance with previous research, this paper uses written personality tests for job candidates as a proxy for whether firms care about personality traits of employees, in particular whether these employees are inclined towards reciprocity. Using the British Workplace Employment Relations Survey 2004 (WERS) we find that behavior of employers and employees is consistent with the presence of gift-exchange motives: firms that screen applicants for personality are more likely to pay generous wages and to provide (non-pecuniary) benefits like employer pension, on-the-job training, or job security. Firms likewise benefit from reciprocal employees as they can implement more team-working and are generally more successful. Other modern human resource practises like competency tests or incentive pay only poorly predict these patterns. Moreover, there is no association between dismissals and personality tests, indicating that personality tests do not merely improve the fit between applicant and employer. Hence, we conclude that motivation based on gift-exchange motives remains as the most plausible explanation for our results.

Keywords: reciprocity, organisational structure, employee compensation

JEL Classification: D220, M520

Suggested Citation

Englmaier, Florian and Kolaska, Thomas and Leider, Stephen, Reciprocity in Organisations - Evidence from the WERS (January 30, 2015). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5168, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2559687 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2559687

Florian Englmaier (Contact Author)

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) - Faculty of Economics ( email )

Ludwigstrasse 28 III/ VG
D-80539 Munich
Germany

Thomas Kolaska

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) ( email )

Kaulbachstr. 45
München, 80539

Stephen Leider

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business ( email )

701 Tappan Street
Ann Arbor, MI MI 48109
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www-personal.umich.edu/~leider/

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