Characterizing Minimal Impartial Rules for Awarding Prizes

15 Pages Posted: 6 Feb 2015

See all articles by Shohei Tamura

Shohei Tamura

Tohoku University - Graduate School of Economics & Management

Date Written: January 22, 2015

Abstract

We study the problem of choosing prize winners from among a group of experts when each expert nominates another expert for the prize. A nomination rule determines the set of winners on the basis of the profile of nominations; the rule is impartial if one's nomination never influences one's own chance of winning the prize. In this paper, we consider impartial, anonymous, symmetric, and monotonic nomination rules and characterize the set of all minimal such ones. We show that the set consists of exactly one nomination rule: a natural variant of the plurality correspondence called plurality with runners-up.

Keywords: Institutional design; Award rule; Conflict of interest; Impartiality; Plurality correspondence

JEL Classification: D63, D71

Suggested Citation

Tamura, Shohei, Characterizing Minimal Impartial Rules for Awarding Prizes (January 22, 2015). ISER Discussion Paper No. 925, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2561160

Shohei Tamura (Contact Author)

Tohoku University - Graduate School of Economics & Management ( email )

Kawauchi, Aoba-ku
Sendai, 980-8576
Japan

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