Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=256911
 
 

Citations (11)



 
 

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Competition, Monopoly, and Aftermarkets


Dennis W. Carlton


University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Michael Waldman


Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management

January 2001

NBER Working Paper No. w8086

Abstract:     
Consider a durable goods producer that potentially has market power in the aftermarkets associated with its products. An important question is to what extent, if any, should the antitrust laws restrict the firm's behavior in these aftermarkets? In this paper we explore a number of models characterized by either competition or monopoly in the new-unit market, and show that a variety of behaviors that hurt competition in aftermarkets can, in fact, be efficient responses to potential inefficiencies that can arise in aftermarkets. Our results should give courts pause before intervening in aftermarkets.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 53

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Date posted: January 19, 2001  

Suggested Citation

Carlton , Dennis W. and Waldman, Michael, Competition, Monopoly, and Aftermarkets (January 2001). NBER Working Paper No. w8086. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=256911

Contact Information

Dennis W. Carlton (Contact Author)
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
312-322-0215 (Phone)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Michael Waldman
Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management ( email )
Ithaca, NY 14853
United States
607-255-8631 (Phone)
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Citations:  11
Footnotes:  30

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