An Appealing Extension: Extending Martinez v. Ryan to Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

Abstract

In March of 2012, in Martinez v. Ryan, the Supreme Court announced a new type of cause under the cause-and-prejudice exception to procedural default in federal habeas cases. This new type of cause allowed federal courts to review a subset of claims that had been procedurally defaulted in state habeas proceedings due to the ineffectiveness of postconviction counsel. The parameters of that subset were the source of a heated debate on the Supreme Court. The majority, limiting its analysis to the facts before it, claimed that the new definition excused only claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel (IATC). The dissent, however, argued that it would apply to other claims as well. The application of Martinez to excuse procedurally defaulted claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel (IAAC) is the subject of this Note.

Following Martinez, the circuit courts split along the same lines as the majority and dissent in that case: The Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits held that Martinez cannot be used to excuse IAAC claims in addition to IATC claims, whereas the Ninth Circuit held that Martinez can be used to excuse IAAC claims.

Many scholars have also written on the potential impact of Martinez. Some of these scholars have predicted or acknowledged the circuit split. None, however, have analyzed in detail the circuit courts’ limitation of Martinez to excusing IATC claims or explored whether that limitation is the correct result. This Note examines the circuit courts’ and commentators’ arguments both in favor of and against limiting Martinez to the IATC context.