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Impeded Industrial Restructuring: The Growth Penalty


David B. Audretsch


Indiana University - Institute for Development Strategies; King Saud University; WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management; Indiana University Bloomington - School of Public & Environmental Affairs (SPEA)

Martin A. Carree


University of Maastricht - Department of Organization & Strategy

Andre J. Van Stel


Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Economics

Roy Thurik


Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Centre for Advanced Small Business Economics (CASBEC); Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM); EIM Netherlands - Business and Policy Research; Tinbergen Institute

December 2000

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2648

Abstract:     
This paper documents that a process of industrial restructuring has been transforming the developed economies, where large corporations are accounting for less economic activity and small firms are accounting for a greater share of economic activity. Not all countries, however, are experiencing the same shift in their industrial structures. Very little is known about the cost of resisting this restructuring process. The goal of this paper is to identify whether there is a cost, measured in terms of foregone growth, of an impeded restructuring process. The cost is measured by linking growth rates of European countries to deviations from the optimal industrial structure. The empirical evidence suggests that countries impeding the restructuring process pay a penalty in terms of foregone growth.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 31

Keywords: Economic Growth, Entrepreneurship, Firm Size Distribution, Industry Structure

JEL Classification: L11, O11

working papers series


Date posted: January 29, 2001  

Suggested Citation

Audretsch, David B., Carree, Martin A., Van Stel, Andre J. and Thurik, Roy, Impeded Industrial Restructuring: The Growth Penalty (December 2000). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2648. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=258081

Contact Information

David B. Audretsch (Contact Author)
Indiana University - Institute for Development Strategies ( email )
1315 East Tenth Street
Bloomington, IN 47405
United States
812-855-6766 (Phone)
812-855-0184 (Fax)
King Saud University ( email )
Riyadh, 11451
Saudi Arabia
WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management ( email )
Burgplatz 2
Vollender, 56179
Germany
Indiana University Bloomington - School of Public & Environmental Affairs (SPEA) ( email )
1315 East Tenth Street
Bloomington, IN 47405
United States

Martin A. Carree
University of Maastricht - Department of Organization & Strategy ( email )
P.O. Box 616
Maastricht, 6200 MD
Netherlands
Andre J. Van Stel
Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Economics ( email )
Kahlaische Strasse 10
D-07745 Jena
Germany
Roy Thurik
Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Centre for Advanced Small Business Economics (CASBEC) ( email )
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands
+31 10 408 2232 (Phone)
+31 10 408 9146 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.thurik.com
Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) ( email )
P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands
EIM Netherlands - Business and Policy Research
Postbus 7001
2701 AA Zoetermeer
Netherlands
+31 79 341 3634 (Phone)
+31 79 331 3742 (Fax)
Tinbergen Institute ( email )
Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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References:  54
Citations:  18

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