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http://ssrn.com/abstract=258504
 
 

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A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and Refusal to Deal - Why Aspen and Kodak are Misguided


Dennis W. Carlton


University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

February 2001

NBER Working Paper No. w8105

Abstract:     
This paper analyzes the question: When should a single firm have a duty to deal with another? The paper uses a series of economic models to answer the question, assuming the goal is to prevent harm to competition, and applies the economic analysis to the leading cases to show when antitrust enforcement is appropriate and when it is not. The analysis shows that, to prevent harm to competition, the role for antitrust should be quite limited and that two leading cases, Aspen and Kodak, represent a dangerous direction for antitrust policy.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 32

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Date posted: February 3, 2001  

Suggested Citation

Carlton , Dennis W., A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and Refusal to Deal - Why Aspen and Kodak are Misguided (February 2001). NBER Working Paper No. w8105. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=258504

Contact Information

Dennis W. Carlton (Contact Author)
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
312-322-0215 (Phone)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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