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Norms in Private Bankruptcy: The 'London Approach' to the Resolution of Financial Distress

John Armour
University of Oxford - Faculty of Law; Oxford-Man Institute of Quantitative Finance; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Simon Deakin
University of Cambridge - Centre for Business Research (CBR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)


September 2000

University of Cambridge ESRC Working Paper No. 173

Abstract:     
In recent years law and economics scholarship has expanded its frame of reference to incorporate the role of social norms in shaping the incentives of actors. This shift in perspective has yet to filter through to the literature on bankruptcy, which has to date concentrated on the role of legal rules in resolving financial distress. This paper presents qualitative findings on how financial distress is resolved amongst creditors of large UK firms. Such restructurings proceed according to an informal set of market norms known collectively as the "London Approach." The paper suggests that regulatory pressure applied by the Bank of England may have been critical in "seeding" the market norms. It also examines the prospects for the London Approach's future in light of changes in the financial environment brought about by globalisation. The paper points the way towards an incorporation into bankruptcy scholarship of the role played by social norms.

Keywords: Social norms, corporate bankruptcy, London Approach, norm seeding

JEL Classifications: G330, G380, K220, Z130

Working Paper Series

Date posted: February 06, 2001 ; Last revised: May 22, 2003

Suggested Citation

Armour, John and Deakin, Simon F., Norms in Private Bankruptcy: The 'London Approach' to the Resolution of Financial Distress (September 2000). University of Cambridge ESRC Working Paper No. 173. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=258615 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.258615


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Contact Information

John Armour (Contact Author)
University of Oxford - Faculty of Law ( email )
Oriel College
Oxford OX1 4EW
United Kingdom
+44 1865 286544 (Phone)
Oxford-Man Institute of Quantitative Finance ( email )
Blue Boar Court
9 Alfred Street
Oxford, Oxfordshire OX30DL
United Kingdom
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Simon F. Deakin
University of Cambridge - Centre for Business Research (CBR) ( email )
Top Floor, Judge Business School Building
Trumpington Street
Cambridge CB2 1AG United Kingdom
+ 44 1223 335243 (Phone)
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
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