Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=258937
 
 

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Footnotes (11)



 


 



Why Pay More? Corporate Tax Avoidance Through Transfer Pricing in OECD Countries


Eric J. Bartelsman


Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Roel M. W. J. Beetsma


University of Amsterdam - Research Institute in Economics & Econometrics (RESAM); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Tinbergen Institute - Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam (TIA); Netspar

August 2000

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 324

Abstract:     
This paper presents evidence of profit shifting in response to differences in corporate tax rates for a large selection of OECD countries. In our estimates we control for the effects of tax rate changes on real activity. Our baseline estimates suggest that, on average, a unilateral increase in the corporate tax rate does not lead to an increase in corporate tax revenues owing to a more than offsetting decline in reported profits.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 22

Keywords: Profit shifting, transfer pricing, corporate tax rates, STAN database

JEL Classification: F2, H2

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Date posted: February 7, 2001  

Suggested Citation

Bartelsman, Eric J. and Beetsma, Roel M. W. J., Why Pay More? Corporate Tax Avoidance Through Transfer Pricing in OECD Countries (August 2000). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 324. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=258937

Contact Information

Eric J. Bartelsman
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam ( email )
Amsterdam, ND North Holland
Netherlands
+31 (0)20 44 46044 (Phone)
Tinbergen Institute ( email )
Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany
Roel M. W. J. Beetsma (Contact Author)
University of Amsterdam - Research Institute in Economics & Econometrics (RESAM) ( email )
Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam
Netherlands
+31 20 525 5280 (Phone)
+31 20 525 4254 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de
Tinbergen Institute - Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam (TIA) ( email )
Gustav Mahlerplein 117
Amsterdam, 1082 MS
Netherlands
Netspar ( email )
P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
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