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Currency Unions and International Integration


Andrew K. Rose


University of California - Haas School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Charles M. Engel


University of Wisconsin - Madison - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); University of Washington - Department of Economics

September 2000

NBER Working Paper No. w7872

Abstract:     
This paper characterizes the integration patterns of international currency unions (such as the CFA Franc zone and the East Caribbean Currency Area). We empirically explore different features of currency unions, and compare them both to countries with sovereign monies, and to regions within nations. We ask: are countries within international currency unions as integrated as regions within political unions? We do this by examining the criteria for Mundell's concept of an optimum currency area. We find that members of currency unions are more integrated than countries with their own currencies, but less integrated than regions within a country. For instance, we find that currency union members have more trade and less volatile real exchange rates than countries with their own monies, but less trade and more volatile exchange rates than regions within individual countries. Similarly, business cycles are more highly synchronized across currency union countries than across countries with sovereign monies, but not as synchronized as regions of a single country. Finally, currency union membership is not associated with significantly greater risk sharing, though risk sharing is widespread within countries.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 40

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Date posted: February 6, 2001  

Suggested Citation

Rose, Andrew K. and Engel, Charles M., Currency Unions and International Integration (September 2000). NBER Working Paper No. w7872. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=259007

Contact Information

Andrew K. Rose (Contact Author)
University of California - Haas School of Business ( email )
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
510-642-6609 (Phone)
510-642-4700 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Charles M. Engel
University of Wisconsin - Madison - Department of Economics ( email )
1180 Observatory Drive
Madison, WI 53706
United States
608-262-3697 (Phone)
608-262-2033 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
University of Washington - Department of Economics ( email )
Box 353330
Seattle, WA 98195-3330
United States
206-543-6197 (Phone)
206-685-7477 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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