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When Competition Fails to Optimise Quality: A Look at Search EnginesMaurice E. StuckeUniversity of Tennessee College of Law; The Konkurrenz Group Ariel EzrachiUniversity of Oxford - Faculty of Law April 23, 2015 Yale Journal of Law & Technology (2015, Forthcoming) University of Tennessee Legal Studies Research Paper No. 268 Abstract: The European Commission’s Statement of Objections forms the latest addition to the ongoing debate on the possible misuse of Google’s position in the search engine market. The scholarly debate, however, has largely been over the exclusionary effects of search degradation. Less attention has been attributed to the dimension of quality – whether and how a search engine, faced with rivals, could degrade quality on the free side. We set out to address this fundamental issue: With the proliferation of numerous web search engines and their free usage and availability, could any search engine degrade quality? We begin our analysis with a review of the network effects that may impact the relative power of a search engine. We next identify three necessary, but not sufficient, variables for quality degradation to occur in search results. With these three variables in mind, we consider instances when a search engine could degrade quality despite competition from rival engines.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 42 Keywords: Competition, Antitrust, Search Engines, Quality Competition, Status Quo Bias, Network Effects JEL Classification: K21, L40, L41, L15 Date posted: April 25, 2015 ; Last revised: September 24, 2015Suggested CitationContact Information
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