Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=259815
 
 

Citations (15)



 


 



Relying on the Information of Interested - and Potentially Dishonest - Parties


Chris William Sanchirico


University of Pennsylvania Law School; University of Pennsylvania Wharton School - Business Economics and Public Policy Department

2001

UVA Law School, Legal Studies Working Paper No. 00-12

Abstract:     
This paper investigates the role of evidence production in the regulation of private behavior via judicial and administrative process. The paper presents a model in which the law makes the agent's fine depend on the presentation of evidence whose production cost, in turn, depends on how the agent has behaved in the regulated activity. The targeted behavior becomes more privately beneficial to the agent to the extent that it reduces the agent's evidence costs and so improves its highest obtainable payoffs (net of costs) at the subsequent hearing. This view of evidence production has several notable implications, including that truth-finding has no direct role in deterrence, that non-falsifiable evidence, even when available, is unlikely to be the best choice for the system, and that "overdeterrence" may well be cost effective.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 38

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: February 12, 2001  

Suggested Citation

Sanchirico, Chris William, Relying on the Information of Interested - and Potentially Dishonest - Parties (2001). UVA Law School, Legal Studies Working Paper No. 00-12. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=259815 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.259815

Contact Information

Chris William Sanchirico (Contact Author)
University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )
3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-898-4220 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.upenn.edu/faculty/csanchir/
University of Pennsylvania Wharton School - Business Economics and Public Policy Department
3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6372
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,802
Downloads: 198
Download Rank: 85,089
Citations:  15

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo8 in 0.328 seconds