Cheating and Incentives: Learning from a Policy Experiment

35 Pages Posted: 15 May 2015

See all articles by César Martinelli

César Martinelli

George Mason University - Department of Economics

Susan Parker

Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE) - Division of Economics

Ana Perez-Gea

New York University (NYU); Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) - Economica

Rodimiro Rodrigo

Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico

Date Written: May 15, 2015

Abstract

We use a database generated by a policy intervention that incentivized learning as measured by standardized exams to investigate empirically the relationship between cheating by students and cash incentives to students and teachers. We adapt methods from the education measurement literature to calculate the extent of cheating, and show that cheating is more prevalent under treatments that provide monetary incentives to students (versus no incentives, or incentives only to teachers), both in the sense of a larger number of cheating students per classroom and in the sense of more cheating relations per classroom. We also provide evidence of learning to cheat, with both the number of cheating students per classroom and the average number of cheating relations increasing over the years under treatments that provide monetary incentives to students.

Keywords: cheating, monetary incentives, directed link, directed network

JEL Classification: I21, N36

Suggested Citation

Martinelli, César and Parker, Susan and Perez-Gea, Ana and Rodrigo, Rodimiro, Cheating and Incentives: Learning from a Policy Experiment (May 15, 2015). GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 15-32, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2606487 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2606487

César Martinelli (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )

4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States

Susan Parker

Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE) - Division of Economics ( email )

Carretera Mexico Toluca 3655
01210 Mexico, D.F.
Mexico

Ana Perez-Gea

New York University (NYU) ( email )

Bobst Library, E-resource Acquisitions
20 Cooper Square 3rd Floor
New York, NY 10003-711
United States

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) - Economica ( email )

Mexico

Rodimiro Rodrigo

Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico ( email )

Palacio Nacional s/n. Col Centro, Del. Cuauhtémoc
Distrito Federal, C.P. 06000
Mexico

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