Human Rights Theory, 3: The Three Pillars of Democracy: The Human Rights to Democratic Governance, Intellectual Freedom, and Moral Equality

21 Pages Posted: 29 May 2015 Last revised: 24 Sep 2015

Date Written: May 27, 2015

Abstract

This is the third in a series of papers I began posting in late April 2015. Each paper addresses an issue, or a set of related issues, in Human Rights Theory. The overarching subject of the first two papers: the morality of human rights. For the first two papers, see “Human Rights Theory, 1: What Are ‘Human Rights’? Against the ‘Orthodox’ View” (2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2597403; “Human Rights Theory, 2: What Reason Do We Have, if Any, to Take Human Rights Seriously? Beyond ‘Human Dignity’” (2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2597404. In the third and fourth papers, I pursue the implications of the morality of human rights for democracy.

As I explained in “Human Rights Theory, 2,” the “act towards all human beings in a spirit of brotherhood” imperative is the normative ground of human rights: Each of the human rights articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and/or in one or more of the several international human rights treaties that have followed in the UDHR’s wake is a specification of what the imperative, in conjunction with all other relevant considerations, is thought to forbid or to require. I focus in this, the third paper on three human rights that are articulated both in the UDHR and in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR): the right to democratic governance, the right to intellectual freedom, and the right to moral equality. Each of the three rights is a compelling specification of what the “in a spirit of brotherhood” imperative forbids or requires; each is also one of the three pillars of democracy — “democracy” in the broad modern understanding of the term. Therefore, a commitment to the morality of human rights — a commitment, more precisely, to what I described in “Human Rights Theory, 2” as the heart of the morality of human rights, namely, the “in a spirit of brotherhood” imperative — not only supports but requires a commitment to democracy — a commitment, that is, to the three pillars of democracy: the human rights to democratic governance, intellectual freedom, and moral equality.

As I explain in the fourth paper, which is a companion to this paper, a commitment to the “in a spirit of brotherhood” imperative — a commitment, in that sense, to the morality of human rights — requires a commitment not only to democracy but also to certain limitations on democracy — certain limitations on what democratic government may do to, and certain limitations on what democratic government may refrain from doing for, the human beings over whom it exercises power. See “Human Rights Theory, 4: Democracy Limited: The Human Right to Religious and Moral Freedom” (2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2610942.

Suggested Citation

Perry, Michael John, Human Rights Theory, 3: The Three Pillars of Democracy: The Human Rights to Democratic Governance, Intellectual Freedom, and Moral Equality (May 27, 2015). Emory Legal Studies Research Paper No. 15-354, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2610941

Michael John Perry (Contact Author)

Emory University School of Law ( email )

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