Leniency and Damages

43 Pages Posted: 29 Jun 2015

See all articles by Paolo Buccirossi

Paolo Buccirossi

Laboratorio di economia, antitrust, regolamentazione (LEAR)

Catarina M. P. Marvão

Technological University Dublin; Stockholm School of Economics - Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE)

Giancarlo Spagnolo

University of Rome Tor Vergata; EIEF; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Stockholm School of Economics (SITE)

Date Written: June 2015

Abstract

Damage actions may reduce the attractiveness of leniency programs for cartel participants if their cooperation with the competition authority increases the chance that the cartel’s victims will bring a successful suit. A long legal debate culminated in an EU directive, adopted in November 2014, which seeks a balance between public and private enforcement. It protects the effectiveness of a leniency program by preventing the use of leniency statements in subsequent actions for damages. Our analysis shows such compromise is not required: limiting the cartel victims’ ability to recover their loss is not necessary to preserve the effectiveness of a leniency program and may be counterproductive. We show that damage actions will actually improve its effectiveness, through a legal regime in which the civil liability of the immunity recipient is minimized and full access to all evidence collected by the competition authority, is granted to claimants, like in the US.

Keywords: cartels, competition policy, Leniency Program, private and public enforcement

JEL Classification: C72, C73, D43, D81, H11, K21, K42, L13, L44, L51

Suggested Citation

Buccirossi, Paolo and Marvão, Catarina Moura Pinto and Spagnolo, Giancarlo, Leniency and Damages (June 2015). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10682, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2624637

Paolo Buccirossi (Contact Author)

Laboratorio di economia, antitrust, regolamentazione (LEAR) ( email )

Via di Monserrato 48
Rome, 00186
Italy
+39 066 830 0530 (Phone)

Catarina Moura Pinto Marvão

Technological University Dublin ( email )

Dublin
Ireland

Stockholm School of Economics - Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE) ( email )

P.O. Box 6501
S-113 83 Stockholm, 11383
Sweden

Giancarlo Spagnolo

University of Rome Tor Vergata ( email )

Faculty of Economics - DEF
Via Columbia 2
Rome, RM 00133
Italy

EIEF ( email )

Via Due Macelli, 73
Rome, 00187
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://WWW.EIEF.IT

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Stockholm School of Economics (SITE) ( email )

P.O. Box 6501
Stockholm
Sweden

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/giancarlospagnoloshomepage/

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