Peer Effects of Corporate Social Responsibility

Management Science, Vol. 65, 2019

57 Pages Posted: 23 Jul 2015 Last revised: 24 Jul 2020

See all articles by Jie Cao

Jie Cao

The Hong Kong Polytechnic University - School of Accounting and Finance

Hao Liang

Singapore Management University - Lee Kong Chian School of Business; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Xintong Zhan

Department of Finance, School of Management, Fudan University

Date Written: March 31, 2018

Abstract

We investigate how firms react to their product-market peers’ commitment to and adoption of corporate social responsibility (CSR) using a regression discontinuity design approach. Relying on the passage or failure of CSR proposals by a narrow margin of votes during shareholder meetings, we find the passage of a close-call CSR proposal and its implementation are followed by the adoption of similar CSR practices by peer firms. In addition, peers that have greater difficulty in catching up with the voting firm in CSR experience significantly lower stock returns around the passage, consistent with the notion that the spillover effect of the adoption of CSR is a strategic response to competitive threat. Using alternative definitions of peers and examining underlying mechanisms, we further rule out alternative explanations such as that based on propagation by financial intermediaries.

Keywords: Corporate social responsibility; peer effects; product markets; shareholder proposal; regression discontinuity

JEL Classification: M14; L10; G14; G30

Suggested Citation

Cao, Jie and Liang, Hao and Zhan, Xintong, Peer Effects of Corporate Social Responsibility (March 31, 2018). Management Science, Vol. 65, 2019, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2634100 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2634100

Jie Cao

The Hong Kong Polytechnic University - School of Accounting and Finance ( email )

Hung Hom, Kowloon
Hong Kong

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/jiejaycao

Hao Liang (Contact Author)

Singapore Management University - Lee Kong Chian School of Business ( email )

469 Bukit Timah Road
Singapore 912409
Singapore

HOME PAGE: http://business.smu.edu.sg/faculty/profile/130396/LIANG-Hao

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Xintong Zhan

Department of Finance, School of Management, Fudan University ( email )

No. 670, Guoshun Road
No.670 Guoshun Road
Shanghai, 200433
China

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/view/xintongzhan

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