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Culture, Openness, and Finance


Rohan Williamson


Georgetown University - McDonough School of Business

Rene M. Stulz


Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

March 2001

Dice Center Working Paper No. 2001-02

Abstract:     
Religions have little to say about shareholders but have much to say about creditors. We find that the origin of a country's legal system is more important than its religion and language in explaining shareholder rights. However, a country's principal religion helps predict the cross-sectional variation in creditor rights better than a country's openness to international trade, its language, its income per capita, or the origin of its legal system. Catholic countries protect the rights of creditors less than other countries, and long-term debt is less important in these countries. A country's openness to international trade mitigates the influence of religion on creditor rights. Religion and language are also important predictors of how countries enforce rights.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 46

JEL Classification: G15, G30, G38

working papers series


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Date posted: March 22, 2001  

Suggested Citation

Williamson, Rohan G. and Stulz, Rene M., Culture, Openness, and Finance (March 2001). Dice Center Working Paper No. 2001-02. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=263507 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.263507

Contact Information

Rohan G. Williamson
Georgetown University - McDonough School of Business ( email )
3700 O Street, NW
Washington, DC 20057
United States
202-687-2284 (Phone)
202-687-4031 (Fax)

Rene M. Stulz (Contact Author)
Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Finance ( email )
2100 Neil Avenue
Columbus, OH 43210-1144
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.cob.ohio-state.edu/fin/faculty/stulz

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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