A Defense of Humean Property Theory

Legal Theory, Forthcoming 2021

34 Pages Posted: 25 Jul 2015 Last revised: 19 May 2021

Date Written: June 18, 2020

Abstract

Two rival approaches to property rights dominate contemporary political philosophy: Lockean natural rights and egalitarian theories of distributive justice. This article defends a third approach, which can be traced to the work of David Hume. Unlike Lockean rights, Humean property rights are not grounded in pre-institutional moral entitlements. In contrast to the egalitarian approach, which begins with highly abstract principles of distributive justice, Humean theory starts with simple property conventions and shows how more complex institutions can be justified against a background of settled property rights. Property rights allow people to coordinate their use of scarce resources. For property rules to serve this function effectively, certain questions must be considered settled. Treating existing property entitlements as having prima facie validity facilitates cooperation between people who disagree about distributive justice. Lockean and egalitarian theories endorse moral claims that threaten to unsettle property conventions and undermine social cooperation.

Keywords: Property, Property Rights, Property Theory, Political Philosophy, Distributive Justice, Private Law, David Hume

Suggested Citation

Lindsay, Ira, A Defense of Humean Property Theory (June 18, 2020). Legal Theory, Forthcoming 2021, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635246 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2635246

Ira Lindsay (Contact Author)

University of Surrey ( email )

Frank Whittle Bld (AB) 5th Floor
School of Law FASS University of Surrey
Guildford, GU2 7XH
United Kingdom

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