Download This PaperThe Symmetric Equilibria of Symmetric Voter Participation Games with Complete Information
25 Pages Posted: 26 Jul 2015 Last revised: 10 Jun 2016
Date Written: June 10, 2016
Abstract
We characterize the symmetric Nash equilibria of the symmetric voter participation game with complete information introduced by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983). To do so, we use methods based on polynomials in Bernstein form to determine how the probability that a voter is pivotal depends on the participation probability and the number of players in the game.
Keywords: Costly voting, Participation games, Mixed strategy equilibrium, Polynomials in Bernstein form
JEL Classification: C72, D72
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Nöldeke, Georg and Nöldeke, Georg and Peña, Jorge, The Symmetric Equilibria of Symmetric Voter Participation Games with Complete Information (June 10, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635697 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2635697
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