Promotion Signaling, Discrimination, and Positive Discrimination Policies

45 Pages Posted: 1 Aug 2015 Last revised: 2 Mar 2019

See all articles by Marc Gürtler

Marc Gürtler

University of Braunschweig - Institute of Technology, Department of Finance

Oliver Gürtler

University of Cologne

Date Written: July 30, 2015

Abstract

This paper studies discrimination in a model in which promotions are used as signals of worker ability. The model can account for statistical and taste-based discrimination. In the short run, a positive discrimination policy is beneficial for workers in the middle of the ability distribution because these workers are promoted if and only if the policy is in place. Instead, workers of either high or low ability suffer from the policy. In the long run, the policy benefits all targeted workers. The model can explain empirical findings about the effects of a gender quota on the boards of Norwegian companies.

Keywords: promotion, signaling, discrimination, positive discrimination policy

JEL Classification: D83, J24, J31, J78, M51

Suggested Citation

Gürtler, Marc and Gürtler, Oliver, Promotion Signaling, Discrimination, and Positive Discrimination Policies (July 30, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2637975 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2637975

Marc Gürtler

University of Braunschweig - Institute of Technology, Department of Finance ( email )

Abt-Jerusalem-Str. 7
Braunschweig, 38106
Germany

Oliver Gürtler (Contact Author)

University of Cologne ( email )

Albertus-Magnus-Platz
Cologne, 50923
Germany

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