Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=263810
 
 

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Underpricing and Entrepreneurial Wealth Losses in IPOs:
Theory and Evidence


Alexander Ljungqvist


New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

Michel A. Habib


University of Zurich; Swiss Finance Institute

February 2000


Abstract:     
We model owners as solving a multidimensional problem when taking their firms public. Owners can affect the level of underpricing through the choices they make in promoting an issue, such as which underwriter to hire or what exchange to list on. The benefits of reducing underpricing in this way depend on the owners' participation in the offering and the magnitude of the dilution they suffer on retained shares. We argue that the extent to which owners trade-off underpricing and promotion is determined by the minimization of their wealth losses. Evidence from a sample of U.S. IPOs confirms our empirical predictions.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 42

JEL Classification: G32

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Date posted: May 10, 2001  

Suggested Citation

Ljungqvist, Alexander and Habib, Michel A., Underpricing and Entrepreneurial Wealth Losses in IPOs: Theory and Evidence (February 2000). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=263810 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.263810

Contact Information

Alexander Ljungqvist (Contact Author)
New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance ( email )
Stern School of Business
44 West 4th Street, Suite 9-160
New York, NY 10012-1126
United States
212-998-0304 (Phone)
212-995-4220 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~aljungqv
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) ( email )
Box 55665
Grevgatan 34, 2nd floor
Stockholm, SE-102 15
Sweden
Michel A. Habib
University of Zurich ( email )
Plattenstrasse 14
Zurich, 8032
Switzerland
41-44-634-2507 (Phone)
41-44-634-4903 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.isb.uzh.ch/institut/profs/mhabib.htm
Swiss Finance Institute ( email )
c/o University of Geneve
40, Bd du Pont-d'Arve
1211 Geneva, CH-6900
Switzerland

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